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Abstract—We address the problem of online payments, where
users can transfer funds among themselves. We introduce
Astro, a system solving this problem efficiently in a decen-
tralized, deterministic, and completely asynchronous manner.
Astro builds on the insight that consensus is unnecessary to
prevent double-spending. Instead of consensus, Astro relies on
a weaker primitive—Byzantine reliable broadcast—enabling a
simpler and more efficient implementation than consensus-
based payment systems.
In terms of efficiency, Astro executes a payment by merely
broadcasting a message. The distinguishing feature of Astro is
that it can maintain performance robustly, i.e., remain unaf-
fected by a fraction of replicas being compromised or slowed
down by an adversary. Our experiments on a public cloud
network show that Astro can achieve near-linear scalability in
a sharded setup, going from 10K payments/sec (2 shards) to
20K payments/sec (4 shards). In a nutshell, Astro can match
VISA-level average payment throughput, and achieves a 5×
improvement over a state-of-the-art consensus-based solution,
while exhibiting sub-second 95th percentile latency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online payment systems promise secure financial trans-
actions despite distrustful parties. Transactions need to be
processed correctly despite crashes and even Byzantine (i.e,
malicious) behavior of a fraction of the participants [54].
Popular examples of payment systems include centralized
solutions such as PayPal or VISA, as well as decentralized
ones like Bitcoin [66] and Ethereum [81]. Numerous newer
alternatives are also appearing, claiming new grounds in
terms of performance or security [2], [10], [37], [39].
While many payment systems [10], [81] allow for more
general transactions (known as smart contracts) [27], in
this paper we focus exclusively on payments: allowing a
participant Alice to transfer funds to a beneficiary Bob
if Alice’s balance is high enough. Payments represent the
largest application of blockchains today, they have driven
blockchain systems from their very beginning (Bitcoin) and
continue to do so (Facebook’s Libra and many others [32],
[35], [45], [46], [58], [63], [68], [78]).
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We introduce Astro, a decentralized payment system capa-
ble of matching the performance of the largest centralized
solutions (e.g., 65K peak, 7K average transactions per
second, as recently reported by VISA [77]) for payments.
Astro provides honest participants with robust perfor-
mance, namely stable throughput and latency; this holds
independently of network scheduling (i.e., asynchrony) and
of compromised replicas, as long as no more than 1/3 of the
replicas are affected. Systems building on total order (i.e.,
agreement), in contrast, are often susceptible to throughput
degradation due to a single slow replica, typically the leader.
This is an issue that received significant attention in the
literature [9], [15], [29], [34], [64], which we discuss in detail
(§VII) and also quantify experimentally (§VI-D).
An important insight underlying Astro is that totally order-
ing all payments can be avoided. Indeed, recent theoretical
results show that total order (and hence consensus) is not
necessary for preventing double-spending [45], [46]. The
main contribution of this paper is to apply this insight by
building, for the first time, an asynchronous deterministic
payment system that is decentralized and consensus-free, and
reporting on the empirical evaluation of this system.
Roughly speaking, instead of requiring a total order, we
give clients direct control over (the ordering of) the payments
they initiate. Prior solutions require agreement—usually via
an expensive consensus protocol [11], [36], [79]—on the
order across the payments of all clients. Each client in Astro
independently orders their payments, thus maximizing the
degree of concurrency and improving efficiency. As a result,
a payment operation essentially reduces to broadcasting a
message. A weak broadcast primitive, called Byzantine reli-
able broadcast (BRB) is sufficient for this purpose [18], [43],
[46]. This primitive can be implemented in an asynchronous
network, unlike consensus and total order broadcast [36].
The performance of Astro, even in uncivil executions, is only
limited by the speed of honest participants.
To record payment operations, Astro maintains a log
separately for each client. Whenever Alice makes a new
payment, she announces—through the broadcast layer—her
intent to record this payment in her (replicated) log. Payments
in her log are ordered by sequence numbers she assigns
herself. Astro guarantees that only Alice, the spender, may
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record new payments in her log; we call this abstraction an
exclusive log, or xlog for short.
Essentially, preventing Alice from double-spending means
preventing her from reusing sequence numbers. To do so, the
broadcast layer in Astro provides Byzantine resilience. This
ensures that a malicious client cannot broadcast two different
payments with the same sequence number. For example,
Alice cannot broadcast a payment a for beneficiary Bob with
sequence number s, and for that same sequence number,
announce a different payment a’ for beneficiary Carol. At
most one of these conflicting payments passes through the
broadcast layer. As a result, Alice cannot double-spend.
Astro distinguishes between clients of the system and repli-
cas that operate the payment system. Clients usually connect
to the system infrequently to submit payments and check their
balance. Intuitively, each client is a lightweight participant
and thus relies on a certain replica—called a representative—
to broker her payments via broadcast. Nevertheless, each
client controls the ordering of her own payments. Replicas
maintain the system state (i.e., client xlogs), remain well-
connected to each other, and implement the broadcast-based
replication layer. Payments are safe and live as long as the
spender and 2/3 of the replicas, including the representative
replica handling the request, are correct.
This distinction between client and replica allows the
number of clients in Astro to scale independently of replicas;
a client may, of course, be its own representative. The
broadcast layer (implemented by replicas) relies on quorum
systems [60] to ensure Byzantine resilience, and consequently
does not scale beyond tens or hundreds of replicas. The
number of clients, on the other hand, can be orders of
magnitude larger.
For pedagogical reasons, we proceed in an incremental
manner. We first discuss an implementation of Astro without
using digital signatures, before moving to a more efficient
scheme with digital signatures and fewer messages. To scale
the number of replicas in Astro, we employ a sharding
scheme: We partition the system state and replicate each
partition among a subset of replicas. Sharding a payment
system is difficult if payments need to be totally ordered
(i.e., based on consensus): Approving a cross-shard payment
requires all involved shards to coordinate, usually via a 2PC
protocol [51], [84]. We sidestep this major difficulty because
the shard of the spender can—in our case—unilaterally
approve a cross-shard payment. Astro requires no cross-
shard coordination on the critical path of payment execution.
The beneficiary receives her funds via an asynchronous
notification mechanism after the spender’s shard approves
it. Again, for simplicity of presentation, we present first the
non-sharded case before explaining the sharded solution.
We evaluate Astro on a public wide-area cloud network
(Amazon EC2). We show that even without sharding and
even in synchronous and failure-free executions, Astro out-
performs a state-of-the-art consensus-based payment system.
Considering four shards with 52 replicas per shard, Astro can
sustain up to 20K payments per second at sub-second (95th
percentile) latency. But more importantly, Astro provides ro-
bust performance: In executions where some replica crashes
or suffers from high network latencies, overall throughput
is unaffected (except for the failed replica). Leader-based
consensus systems can experience throughput degradation
in such situations, to the point where payment execution
blocks altogether when the leader is affected, as we show
empirically.
Contributions. We design Astro with a focus on payments
for a permissioned model. Our system lacks some capabilities
compared to mature blockchains (e.g., Sybil resistance, smart
contracts, or full decentralization as Bitcoin or Ethereum)
or global payment systems (e.g., negative balance, fraud
detection as VISA). We do not intend Astro to replace such
systems, but rather demonstrate the efficiency and power of
broadcast for improving existing solutions.
Astro circumvents consensus-inherent complexities, being
the first payment system that is completely asynchronous, de-
terministic, and guarantees robust performance. In summary:
1) Astro introduces the abstraction of an exclusive log:
A record of client payments uniquely controlled by
a certain client. Astro maintains the consistency of
exclusive logs through a weak broadcast primitive,
thus maximizing concurrency and efficiency.
2) Astro is fully asynchronous, including support for an
asynchronous sharding mechanism for scalability.
3) Our Astro implementation can match the performance,
with respect to payments, of centralized solutions (e.g.,
VISA) in a robust manner.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first
overview Astro (§II) and then detail its payment protocol
(§III). We describe our two implementations of Astro (§IV),
and present our asynchronous sharding (§V) scheme. Then
we discuss a thorough experimental evaluation of Astro
(§VI) and present related work (§VII). In the appendix of
this paper, we provide additional details on asynchronous
reconfiguration (§A) and the broadcast layers of Astro (§B).
II. OVERVIEW
At the heart of Astro lie two building blocks that are
closely related to each other. These distinguish our payment
system from prior solutions, namely: (1) exclusive logs, or
xlogs, and (2) a broadcast-based replication layer.
Exclusive Logs. An xlog is an append-only log comprising
all the outgoing payment operations initiated by a certain
client. Intuitively, the xlog of Alice can be seen as her
personal ledger of expenditures. Alice is exclusively allowed
to append payments to her xlog, and we refer to Alice as the
owner of her log.
It is Alice herself who establishes the ordering of payment
operations in her xlog, by assigning a sequence number to
each payment. Besides a sequence number, each payment
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Fig. 1: System state in Astro, consisting of multiple xlogs
(exclusive logs). Each xlog contains payments operations having
the same spender (i.e., belonging to the same client). For example,
Bob’s xlog comprises two operations; the second of these is a
payment of $43 from Bob to Alice, having sequence number 1.
also specifies the spender (which is always Alice in this case),
the amount, and the beneficiary of the payment.
Astro’s state consists of multiple xlogs, one per client, as
we sketch in Figure 1. In the basic version of Astro, each
replica holds a copy of the entire state (we revise this to
consider sharding in §V).
In a static system, storing xlogs could be completely
avoided, by only storing balances and a single sequence
number for each client. Storing the xlogs is crucial for re-
configuration of Astro, i.e., for dynamically changing system
membership (§A) and to enable auditability.
Consistent Replication of xlogs. The goal of the replica-
tion layer in Astro is to keep all xlogs consistent across
replicas despite Byzantine failures. To do so efficiently, we
exploit an idiosyncrasy of xlogs, namely that each such
log restricts append access to the (authenticated) owner
client. Consequently, we never have to deal with concurrent
modifications on a xlog. Each client can modify their own
xlog autonomously: Astro supports concurrent modification
of any number of xlogs.
Each client is associated with a single replica acting as its
representative. A single replica can represent many clients.
The representative is in charge of broadcasting the client’s
payments to other replicas, and corresponds to a broker or
a bank. Akin to a real bank, only the representative can
broadcast outgoing payments for a client’s xlog. All payments
still have to be ordered and submitted by the client. Unlike
with banks, however, multiple replicas in Astro replicate each
client’s data (xlog).
A client performs a payment by submitting it to her
representative r. Replica r ensures that all copies of the
client’s xlog are updated consistently. To this end, replicas
implement a broadcast primitive guaranteeing the following
crucial property: no client can announce two conflicting
payments (i.e., with the same spender) for the same sequence
number, despite Byzantine clients and/or replicas. In other
words, Astro guarantees total order within—but not across—
xlogs, departing from prior designs that employ a total order
across all payments (Figure 2). From the clients’ perspective,
Astro provides FIFO guarantees [49], [56].
As we pointed out, current decentralized payment systems
achieve consistent replication by executing a consensus pro-
tocol [10], [51], [66], while also tackling broader problems
(e.g., implementing smart contracts). In many cases, consen-
sus poses a performance bottleneck and is the usual suspect in
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Fig. 2: Payment protocol overview in Astro. When Alice wants
to make a payment a, she simply submits a to her representative
replica r1. This replica handles the broadcasting of Alice’s payment.
Eventually, all correct replicas deliver a, append this payment to
Alice’s xlog (on position 2), and update client balances accordingly
to reflect this payment.
problems regarding correctness or complexity [1], [24], [29],
given its numerous impossibilities and inherent tradeoffs [11],
[36], [40], [64], [79].
In Astro, we replace the consensus building block with a
broadcast layer. Formally, Astro builds on Byzantine reliable
broadcast (BRB). This should not be confused with classic
Byzantine Agreement (BA), which is unsolvable in the asyn-
chronous model we assume [36]. The BRB primitive is not
novel, appearing in the literature for over 30 years, starting
with Bracha & Toueg [18], [19]. The crucial difference
to BA that allows asynchronous implementations of BRB
is termination: BA always guarantees termination, whereas
BRB does not guarantee this property if the spender is
faulty [45]. Stated differently, if the spender client proposes
two conflicting payments (double-spending) under BRB, it is
possible that no payment will ever execute.
III. PAYMENTS IN ASTRO
Astro is a replicated system running on N replicas of an
asynchronous network. The replicas implement a broadcast-
based replication layer and maintain the full system state,
which they update consistently to reflect client payments.
Both clients and replicas hold an identifying public/secret
key-pair. We assume that (1) replica key-pairs are distributed
in advance among all replicas, which makes Astro a permis-
sioned payment system, and (2) the mapping of clients to
their representative replicas is publicly known. We assume
less than N/3 of replicas to be Byzantine. This is a standard
assumption, but we revisit this aspect later, when we intro-
duce partial replication via sharding (§V). We now describe
the basic payment protocol.
At a high level, payment execution comprises three steps:
1) The client submits a payment a to her representative.
2) The representative broadcasts a to all replicas.
3) Replicas locally approve payment a and append it to
their local copy of the corresponding client’s xlog.
If the client and representative replica are both correct, each
of these three steps is guaranteed to terminate. A correct
client, however, is unaffected by other Byzantine clients.
Specifically, no client will ever be able to double-spend or
prevent any other client from performing payments, as long
as less than 1/3 of replicas are malicious.
We now describe the three aforementioned steps in detail.
For presentation simplicity, we use pseudocode inspired by
Golang which we assume to execute atomically.
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Submitting a Payment. In Listing 1 we describe the algo-
rithm a client Alice implements to submit a payment. First,
she creates a payment message comprising the identity of
the spender (herself), the sequence number she assigns to
this payment, as well as the identity of the beneficiary, and
the amount. Alice then increments her sequence number,
and finally sends the payment to her representative replica
through an authenticated channel (line 7).
1 @executes at spender Alice
2 @local state: Client Alice;
3 Sequence number mySN;
4 func Pay(Client b, Amount x):
5 a := 〈Alice, mySN, b, x〉
6 mySN += 1 // Increment our sequence number.
7 Send(a) // Submit the payment to her representative.
Listing 1: Client Alice submits a new payment.
Broadcasting a Payment. When the representative receives
Alice’s payment, it broadcasts this payment among the repli-
cas using the underlying Byzantine reliable broadcast (BRB)
layer. BRB ensures that all correct replicas will eventually
deliver Alice’s message if her representative replica is correct.
This layer implements a consistency check ensuring that no
two correct replicas deliver a different message for the same
sequence number of a certain client. We discuss the broadcast
layer in more detail later (§IV).
Approving a Payment. Upon delivery of a payment mes-
sage from the broadcast layer, each replica locally approves
Alice’s payment, and then settles it (see lines 13, 14 in List-
ing 2).
8 @executes at all system replicas
9 @local state: SeqNrMap sn[..] // last SN per client
10 BalancesMap bal[..] // balances per client
11 XLogMap xlogs[..] // xlogs of clients
12 callback Deliver(a)
13 approve(a) // Blocks waiting for approval of this payment
14 settle(a) // Apply the payment locally
Listing 2: A payment a is ready. Each correct replica runs this
callback upon delivering a from the underlying broadcast layer.
Approval. The approval procedure is described in Listing 3.
Each replica in Astro executes this procedure with the goal
of ensuring two important properties:
1) All Alice’s preceding payments are approved (line 17).
2) Alice has sufficient funds for her payment, as reflected
by her balance (line 18).
If both Alice and her representative are correct, these
conditions may be unfulfilled at replica q only if q has not
yet approved either:
1) Alice’s preceding payment, or
2) Some other payment crediting Alice.
In such a case, q simply waits until both conditions are satis-
fied. Under normal conditions, correct clients would initiate
payments which they can fulfill straight away. Nevertheless,
it can be useful to allow Alice to initiate payments despite
not having enough funds to settle them right away. Such
payments (and all subsequent ones) will not be approved until
Alice has sufficient balance.
15 func approve(a)
16 let a be 〈Alice, n, _, x〉
17 wait until sn[Alice] = n - 1 // Approval criterion (1)
18 wait until bal[Alice] ≥ x // Approval criterion (2)
Listing 3: Payment approval. Every replica executes this to
approve a payment a, assuming spender Alice.
Settling. As the final step in payment execution, each replica
settles this payment (Listing 4), i.e., updates the balances of
the spender and beneficiary, updates the sequence number of
the spender client, and records the payment in the spender’s
xlog. Note that maintaining the whole history of payments in
the xlog is not strictly necessary for the safety of the basic
payment protocol. In a static system, storing the balances
and sequence numbers for each client suffices. Yet, having
this log enables auditability and supports a system where the
set of replicas may change for growth, repair or reconfigura-
tion (§A).
19 func settle(a)
20 let a be 〈Alice, n, b, x〉
21 bal[Alice] -= x // Withdraw from Alice’s balance
22 bal[b] += x // Deposit to beneficiary
23 sn[Alice] += 1
24 xlogs[Alice].append(a)
Listing 4: Payment settling procedure. Each replica executes
this protocol to transition a payment a to the final, settled state.
Client notification. By default, we assume clients to be
lightweight and intermittently connected, so we omit a spe-
cific step of notifying clients that their transaction settled
(or is cleared in the system). It is simple, however, to
achieve end-to-end notification, by having the client query
her representative for the status of the payment. The latter
can reply after it has finished with the settle step.
Checking the Balance. A client can check her balance by
querying her representative r. To obtain the balance, replica
r simply returns the value from the bal state (defined on
line 10, Listing 2).
IV. A TALE OF TWO VERSIONS
We now turn our attention to the broadcast layer in
Astro. Replicas use this layer to replicate client payments
consistently, and it is implemented using a BRB protocol.
The BRB interface has two methods. First, a replica r can
use Broadcast(a) to reliably send payment a to all replicas
in the system. Second, the Deliver(a) callback triggers at any
correct replica to notify about the delivery of payment a. The
broadcast layer is aware of the payload a, which specifies:
the spender s; sequence number n; beneficiary b; and amount
x. We denote the pair (s,n) to be the identifier of payment a.
We now define the properties of the broadcast layer, inspired
by [59], where payment identifiers are particularly important:
• Agreement. If a correct replica delivers a payment a
with identifier (s, n), then no correct replica delivers
a payment a’ 6= a with the same identifier.
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• Integrity. A correct replica delivers a payment a at most
once, and under the condition that a is broadcast by a
replica r.
• Reliability. If the broadcaster replica of payment a is
correct, then all correct replicas eventually deliver a.
• Totality (optional). If a correct replica delivers payment
a, then every correct replica eventually delivers a.
There is a rich history of protocols implementing BRB [18],
[21], [22], [61]. We mark totality property as optional because
there exist BRB protocols which in fact do not offer this
property by default. Such protocols are appealing because
they are more efficient. If totality is missing, however, an
adversary can mount a partial payments attack against our
payment protocol, as follows. Suppose Alice issues a pay-
ment to Bob, who initially has $0. Let Alice’s representative
rA be malicious, whereas the representative rB of Bob is
correct. In the absence of totality, since rA is malicious,
only rB would deliver and settle Alice’s payment, while
Bob’s xlog in any other replica still has a balance of $0.
Bob cannot spend the $10 he received, because there are no
2f + 1 replicas with the updated version of Bob’s xlog.
We implement and evaluate two versions of BRB, and
thus obtain two versions of our system: Astro I and Astro II.
Astro I uses a BRB protocol [18] that has a similar communi-
cation pattern to our consensus-based baseline and allows for
a fair performance robustness comparison (§VI-D). Astro II,
on the other hand, uses stronger cryptographic primitives
to reduce communication complexity, achieve higher perfor-
mance, and enable sharding. Additionally, Astro II lacks the
totality property, so we compensate for that with an additional
mechanism to prevent the attack we mentioned above.
Both BRB protocols underlying Astro I and Astro II as-
sume less than a third of replicas to be Byzantine and offer
the API we specified earlier. We now describe the broadcast
protocols in our systems; for the pseudocode, we refer the
interested reader to the appendix (§B).
A. Broadcast Protocols & Astro Versions
Astro I implements BRB based on Bracha’s algorithm [19].
Let a be a payment with identifier (s, n) that the representative
replica r is broadcasting on behalf of spender client s.
This protocol relies on authenticated links, e.g., via message
authentication codes (MACs), and comprises three phases.
(1) PREPARE. To broadcast payment a, correct replica r
simply sends a to all replicas in the system.
(2) ECHO. The first time a replica q receives a payment with
identifier (s, n), it sends an ECHO message for this payment
to all replicas in the system.
(3) READY. In this last phase of the protocol, every replica q
waits to collect a Byzantine quorum [60] of ECHO messages
for tuple (s,n) and then q sends a READY message. Alterna-
tively, replica q may send a READY after observing f + 1
READY messages. A correct replica delivers payment a after
gathering 2f +1 matching READY messages for a and after
having delivered the previous payment of client s, i.e., the
payment with identifier (s, n-1).
Observe that Bracha’s protocol entails two phases (ECHO
and READY) of all-to-all communication, i.e., has message
complexity of O(N2). On the plus side, this protocol uses
MACs, thus it is not computationally intensive.
Astro II implements the broadcast layer using a BRB proto-
col with linear (O(N)) message complexity. At a high-level,
this protocol employs digital signatures, and also comprises
three phases. The first phase, called PREPARE, is identical to
the first phase of the broadcast protocol of Astro I. The other
two phases of this protocol are as follows:
(2) ACK. Upon receiving payment a from replica r, every
replica q verifies whether there exists a’ 6= a previously
received for identifier (s, n). If this is not the case, then q
sends a signed ACK message (i.e., a signed hash) of a directly
to replica r. Otherwise, replica q does nothing.
(3) COMMIT. Upon gathering a Byzantine quorum [60] of
matching acknowledgments for payment a, replica r sends
to all other replicas a COMMIT message, comprising the
gathered acknowledgments. Each correct replica delivers a
after receiving a correct commit message for a.
To prevent the partial payments attack, we introduce
dependencies in Astro II. A correct replica that approved
Alice’s payment, unicasts the signed approval called CREDIT
message to Bob’s representative, and allows Bob to prove
the existence of a payment crediting his account unequiv-
ocably with f + 1 such CREDIT messages. To this end,
Bob’s representative replica collects and aggregates CREDIT
messages for the same incoming payment into a dependency
certificate for Bob’s xlog. If Bob’s representative fails in any
way, this certificate is not lost; the certificate is permanently
stored as CREDIT messages, distributed across the replicas
that approved the payment, so it can be reconstructed directly
from these replicas.
Note that replicas must keep track of used certificates,
ensuring that each payment takes effect not more than once.
This way, it is impossible for replicas to mistakenly apply a
dependency twice (e.g., double-deposit, as in a replay attack).
Listings 3 and 4 have to be adjusted to take dependencies into
account, see pseudocode in §B.
Certificates also play an important role in a sharded envi-
ronment, as they are transferable across shards: They enable
Bob to spend the money mentioned in the dependency not
only within his representative’s shard, but also across shards
(§V). Whenever Bob submits an outgoing payment, his
representative replica attaches the accumulated dependencies
alongside the outgoing payment.
Comparison. Astro II is well-suited for environments where
bandwidth is scarce (e.g., WAN), whereas Astro I has lower
computation requirements and is therefore suited for systems
where computing resources are more scarce. Given a batching
scheme, however, we can amortize the cost of digital signa-
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tures in Astro II, as we describe later (§VI-A). Moreover, we
expect the typical deployment of our system to be a wide-area
network where bandwidth is the scarce resource. Because of
these reasons, Astro II has an edge over Astro I in terms of
performance—a hypothesis we quantify in our experimental
evaluation (§VI-C).
The two systems handle transitive transactions differently.
Astro I does not reject insufficiently funded transactions
(line 18, Listing 3), instead it queues them until enough funds
arrive. Queuing is necessary even with totality, since different
replicas may receive crediting transactions at different times.
Instead, the dependencies mechanism in Astro II allow the
spender’s representative to prove that the spender has suffi-
cient funds to issue a payment.
There is an additional important distinction between
Astro I and Astro II: the latter is amenable to sharding. To
understand why this is the case, we observe that sharding
requires the approval of payments across different shards.
In other words, some shard s1 has to convince some other
shard s2 that s1 approved a certain payment and s2 can settle
it. Digital signatures simplify this transfer of trust between
shards, because the payment of a spender from s1 appears as
a dependency in the xlog of the beneficiary in s2. Replicas
in s2 accept this dependency when they verify it is signed
by f + 1 replicas of s1. In the next section, we provide the
full details of the sharding mechanism which we implement
in Astro II.
V. ASYNCHRONOUS SHARDING
So far we described our payment protocol (§III) assuming
full replication. In this model, all replicas maintain a full copy
of the system state (i.e., xlogs) and approve and settle every
payment. The full replication architecture is simple to under-
stand and implement, and excels at small scale. This design
poses two scalability problems. First, throughput degrades
with increasing replica count (as we observe experimentally
in §VI-C). Second, each replica has to keep more state as
the number of xlogs (i.e., clients) increases.
We now refine the architecture of our payment system
with sharding, which Astro II implements. Sharding is a
well-known technique [3], [5], [16], [51], [57], [80], [84],
allowing our system to scale-out in terms of both number
of replicas and number of clients. We define a shard as a
subset of system replicas, and to be associated with a subset
of all xlogs. We use the notation s(·) to denote the shard
to which some replica or client “·” belongs. Importantly,
sharding requires strengthening our assumption from §III, so
that the threshold N/3 on Byzantine replicas applies to every
shard.
Intuitively, each shard in Astro II executes an instance of
the basic payment protocol (§III) for its associated clients.
It also incorporates an additional mechanism that not only
prevents partial payment attacks, but also supports sharding
seamlessly. The broadcast step of Astro II is executed in the
shard of the spender, while the CREDIT messages may be
sent to a representative in another shard.
Let us consider a payment of amount x from spender A to
beneficiary B and illustrate how Astro II processes it. Let r
be the representative replica of A.
After broadcasting and approving the payment of client A,
all honest replicas in shard s(A) unicast a CREDIT message
to the beneficiary’s representative in s(B), indicating the
crediting of amount x to the balance of client B. This message
comprises all details of this payment (including the sequence
number n assigned by client A), as well as a signature sig
indicating the approval of the payment from the perspective
of that replica. The representative of B interprets f+1 distinct
CREDIT messages as a dependency certificate, i.e., a proof
that the payment has been accepted by shard s(A). This
dependency certificate is stored at the representative of B and
gets added toB’s balance when the next outgoing transaction
issued by B is settled by the replicas in shard s(B).
Traditional sharded designs employ a 2PC protocol for
coordinating transactions that span multiple shards [12], [38].
The 2PC protocol relies on synchrony and has a delay of 3
communication steps; each such step usually has complexity
O(m) and in the Byzantine case it can reach up to O(m2),
where m is the size of a shard [38], [41]. In contrast, our
protocol based on the CREDIT message entails exactly 1
communication step and has overall complexity O(m). In
our experiments with Astro II implementing the Smallbank
application [33] we observe that this sharding mechanism has
negligible overhead (§VI-C2).
The insight enabling such a simple sharding mechanism in
Astro is that we decouple payment processing at the spender
from the beneficiary. In fact, this mechanism is orthogonal
to how a payment is executed inside a shard (e.g., using a
consensus or a broadcast based protocol).
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We now report on the experimental evaluation of our
consensus-free approach to payment systems. We first de-
scribe the systems we evaluate, namely Astro I and II and a
baseline based on consensus (§VI-A). We also detail our eval-
uation methodology (§VI-B) and present our comprehensive
evaluation, covering both the common-case and performance
robustness (§§ VI-C and VI-D).
A. Systems under Evaluation
We build our baseline on top BFT-SMaRt, a mature state-
of-the-art BFT SMR (i.e., consensus) implementation [15],
used, for example, as the ordering service of Hyperledger
Fabric [74]1. For both Astro systems and BFT-SMaRt under
1 In general, there is a notable difference in complexity between
consensus—in particular, the Byzantine-fault tolerant versions—and broad-
cast algorithms. Both Astro implementations require less than 3.5K LOC in
Golang. Contrast this with libpaxos [71], a simple consensus implementa-
tion for the crash-only model, stretching over more than 6K LOC in C. At
the time of its original publication, the BFT-SMaRt implementation counted
around 13.5K LOC in Java [15, §III].
6
evaluation we assume the optimal threshold of N = 3f + 1
replicas, where f bounds the number of faulty replicas.
Batching in Astro I and II. We employ a 1- or 2-level batch-
ing scheme, depending on the variant of our system. First,
we perform batching at the level of the broadcast protocol.
Note that the first step of the broadcast protocol (PREPARE
in §IV-A) is identical across our two systems. Briefly, some
replica i sending a PREPARE is the one assembling a batch of
payments—potentially from different clients—with the goal
of amortizing both the cost of message authentication and
network processing overheads.
Second, to reduce the overhead of digital signatures neces-
sary for the BRB and the CREDIT messages, Astro II groups
together payments for which the beneficiary clients have the
same representative replica. Thus, when a replica i builds a
batch of payments to be broadcast, it includes sub-batches of
payments segregated according to the beneficiary replica. As
a result, there are as many signatures for CREDIT messages
as there are sub-batches. All payments in the batch are
processed together during broadcast, while the payments in
the sub-batches are processed together when settling and
unicasting.
Even though batching alleviates the computational burden
of cryptographic signatures, it relies on the fact that clients
have to trust their replicas for not issuing transactions without
the former’s consent. However, our approach can protect
clients from malicious representative behavior if the same
protocol adopts end-to-end client signatures.
Cryptography in Astro II. We used ECDSA on the NIST
P-256 curve provided from the Golang standard library,
which offers adequate performance. To avoid cryptographic
operations acting as a CPU bottleneck, we use one signature
per batch of 256 payments in the broadcast layer. With this
batch size, Astro II’s performance is only limited by available
bandwidth.
B. Evaluation Methodology
We use Amazon EC2 as our experimental platform.
Throughout all experiments, we use commodity-level virtual
machines (VMs) of type t2.medium [8], equipped with 4GiB
of RAM and 2 vCores. Unless we explicitly state otherwise,
we deploy each system so that every replica executes on a
separate VM. This avoids creating noise in our results, which
could arise due to performance interference.
Our deployment setup comprises four Amazon EC2 re-
gions in Europe, namely Frankfurt, Ireland, London, and
Paris. On average, the bandwidth and round-trip latency
across machines of these four regions is around 30 MiB/sec
and 20ms, respectively. We deploy the replicas of each
system randomly across the corresponding regions. This de-
ployment reflects a scenario where participants are localized
in one geographic region of the globe (Europe). Later in
our experiments, we also introduce network delays at each
replica. As a result, we lessen the effect of sub-millisecond
latency between replicas in the same region and obtain more
realistic conditions with larger latencies (§VI-C2).
We use up to 15 VMs to deploy clients. Each request from
a client represents one payment. A request contains three
fields (the spender and beneficiary identities, along with the
amount) and the client authentication data. The beneficiary
and amount fields are random, and each payment operation
covers roughly 100 bytes.
For simplicity, we place all client VMs in Ireland. Spread-
ing clients around Europe does not influence our results. Each
such VM hosts a varying number of client processes. The
number of processes varies greatly, depending on each system
and the system size. For instance, to saturate BFT-SMaRt at
system size N = 4, we use around 800 total client threads;
for N = 100, 30 threads are sufficient for saturation. For
Astro, we require more client threads to reach saturation,
since they are capable of higher performance. We report the
maximum achievable performance: our experiments assume
that all transactions can be settled immediately, i.e. clients
have enough balance, so transactions can not be blocked due
to insufficient funds.
For throughput, we report on how many payments each
system settles per second, labeled pps. All experiments have
a runtime of 60 seconds, and we present the average result
across 3 runs. We also plot the standard deviation, but often
this is negligible and not clearly visible in the plots.
In BFT-SMaRt, each client keeps connections to all repli-
cas (a design decision of this protocol) [15]. For this reason,
all BFT-SMaRt clients experience similar latencies. In our
results we report on the latency as observed by a random
client. In our Astro systems, each client connects to a
single, random replica. To make all replicas execute payments
(which is the most realistic scenario), clients pick and submit
their workload to a random replica.
C. Performance Evaluation Results
We seek to answer the broad question of how our asyn-
chronous approach compares in performance, at varying
system sizes, with the consensus baseline. We discuss mi-
crobenchmarks for latency and throughput in a single shard
(§VI-C1), as well as results with the Smallbank [7] bench-
mark in a sharded scenario (§VI-C2).
1) Microbenchmarks:
Throughput. In Figure 3 we depict how throughput evolves
as a function of system size. For each system size, we plot
the peak throughput, i.e., before latency saturates. Note the
logscale axis, to better capture performance differences. We
increase the system size in increments of 6, starting from the
smallest size of 4, until we reach 100.
As an overall observation, our two Astro prototypes out-
perform the consensus-based solution at every system size we
investigate. At small size, all systems exhibit their respective
highest throughput. The consensus-based implementation us-
ing BFT-SMaRt sustains over 10K pps, while Astro reaches
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Fig. 4: Latency/throughput. Performance evaluation of three pay-
ment systems each running at N = 100.
almost 13.5K pps and Astro II sustains 55K pps. The 4x
improvement of Astro II over Astro I is owed to the the linear
communication complexity of the former system (§IV-A).
As can be seen, however, this benefit slowly tapers off with
increasing system size. At maximum system size (N = 100),
the consensus-based system saturates at 334 pps; Astro I
sustains 6x higher throughput, being able to apply 2K pps,
and Astro II can sustain 5K pps (a 16x improvement over
consensus and 2.5x over Astro I).
Latency-Throughput. We now explore the difference in
performance between the consensus-based baseline and Astro
I/II at the maximum system size we consider, N = 100.
As before, all systems are running in a single-shard setup.
The results depicted in Figure 4 show how latency evolves
with respect to throughput. For clarity sake, the y-axis
(latency) starts at 100ms, and we convey order of magnitude
differences using logscale axes.
The consensus-based implementation typically exhibits
sub-second latencies. We do not show the 95th percentile la-
tencies because they obstruct visibility, but these are between
1.3 and 1.5 seconds. Latencies in Astro I are more variable,
between 400 and 500ms prior to saturation, while the 95th
percentile latencies are on the order of one second. Recall that
clients connect to random replicas, which are geographically
spread. Astro II exhibits more stable performance and lower
latencies: prior to saturation, clients observe a confirmation
latency of 200ms on average. The 95th percentile latency (at
low load) is under 240ms. The 99th percentile for all these
systems are within the same order of magnitude as the 95th.
We remark that the latencies for these three systems are
not necessarily at their worst when N = 100. We also
investigate the same execution at N = 10, for instance, and
observe only slightly better performance (e.g., latency for
Astro II is 150ms on average). The latencies do not change
considerably because there is a lot of parallelism inherent in
the underlying quorum-based protocols, both for consensus
and broadcast. This is intuitive: obtaining one response from
a particular distant replica takes roughly as much time as
obtaining several responses (in parallel) from multiple distant
replicas. Primarily, it is throughput that suffers in quorum-
based systems, and latency secondarily [29], [76], [79].
An important observation here is that our evaluation con-
cerns the critical part of a payment system, the ordering
layer. For the deterministic system model, we are only
aware of prior experiments of this layer which considered a
maximum system size of N = 10, concretely for Hyperledger
Fabric [74], which builds on BFT-SMaRt. To conclude this
part of our evaluation, for systems of moderate size—up to
100 replicas—broadcast-based systems are simpler and sig-
nificantly outperform consensus-based solutions for decen-
tralized payments. Even if Astro relies on broadcast, it still
employs quorum-gathering to achieve consistent replication;
hence the throughput of Astro is inversely proportional to the
system size (akin to consensus-based solutions). To avoid this
throughput decay and scale to larger systems, we now discuss
experiments with sharding.
2) Sharding in Smallbank Application: For a real-world
application workload, we use the Smallbank transaction
family from the BLOCKBENCH framework [33]; this is a
version of the H-Store Smallbank benchmark [25] adapted
to the cryptocurrency setting. The application models bank
accounts, where the owners of these accounts are clients
that can issue several types of transactions. In particular,
accounts can be of either savings or checking type. Some
transactions model payments across two accounts of the same
owner, while other transactions deal with the transfer of
funds between different owners. For the sake of consistency,
hereinafter we refer to bank accounts and their owners as
xlogs and clients, respectively.
Experimental Setup. We associate each client with two
xlogs (for checking and savings). Thus same-client transac-
tions at the application level appear as full-fledged payments
between two distinct xlogs in the underlying layer. We use
a multi-shard setup for Astro II, ensuring that both xlogs of
any client belong to the same shard. Whenever a transac-
tion involves different shards, the cross-shard coordination
consists of the CREDIT message described earlier (§V). For
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# tc
delay (ms)
Throughput (Kilo-pps)
per-shard\total
Latency (ms)
Average\95th %ile
Astro II BFT-S† Astro II BFT-S†
#
of
sh
ar
ds
2 0 7.9\15.7 1.0\2.0 204\279 600\808
2 20 5.1\10.2 0.3\0.5 479\705 2245\2673
3 0 5.1\15.4 1.0\3.1 213\375 600\808
3 20 4.5\13.6 0.3\0.8 368\656 2245\2673
4 0 5.0\20.1 1.0\4.1 213\259 600\808
4 20 4.5\18.1 0.3\1.1 354\620 2245\2673
TABLE I: Smallbank sharded benchmark. Performance results
for up to 4 shards (each N = 52 replicas). †BFT-SMaRt results are
upper-bound values based on a single-shard experiment.
BFT-SMaRt, we use an equivalent setup.
Each shard consists of N = 52 replicas uniformly spread
among the four EC2 regions of Europe. We execute using
2, 3 and 4 shards (total of 208 replicas); we limit ourselves
to 4 mainly due to financial constraints, but also because it
is straightforward to estimate performance at larger scales.
Clients attach to a certain replica and simultaneously issue
transactions as prescribed by the Smallbank benchmark,
meaning that 12.5% of the overall number of transactions are
cross-shard. To produce more realistic network conditions,
we introduce artificial network delays: We use the traffic
control (tc) subsystem of the Linux Kernel, and increase
inter-replica latencies by 20ms. Network latency between
replicas in Europe is around 20ms, so having this delay
essentially doubles latencies; additionally, this also eliminates
any advantage that may arise due to co-location of some
replicas in the same EC2 region.
Experimental Results. We provide the results in Table I. We
show both per-shard and overall (i.e., total) throughput for
a given latency envelope. Astro II sustains the highest per-
shard throughput when there are 2 shards. As the number of
shards increases (the # column), per-shard throughput slowly
decreases: This is because intra-shard payments are more
lightweight (lacking the cross-shard notification mechanism)
and the number of intra-shard operations decreases with
growing number of shards [84]. We observe that the 20ms
network delay affects performance. The reason is TCP’s
congestion control: Astro II saturates the links and network
delays become the bottleneck.
As Table I shows, performance in Astro II scales well
with the number of shards. In absolute numbers, Astro II
sustains up to 20K pps using four shards, with average
latencies of around 200ms. The BFT-SMaRt baseline running
on four shards sustains a total throughput of just above 4K
pps; importantly, these result are only for comparison, and
represent optimistic upper-bounds. In BFT-SMaRt we omit
the cross-shard coordination step, which typically consists
of a 2PC protocol posing significant overhead, thus a fully
working sharded solution would necessarily sustain less than
4K pps [51], [84].
D. Performance Robustness
We now investigate how our Astro and the baseline react
to two problems that can arise in practice, namely failure
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Fig. 5: Throughput robustness during crash-stop failures. We
plot throughput when a replica crashes in the consensus-based
system (either the leader or a random replica) and Astro I.
(e.g., crash) and asynchrony (network delays) at a replica.
We consider the impact of these issues when they affect a
random replica in each system, as well as the case when the
leader is affected in the consensus-based system.
Astro I and Astro II have similar robustness characteris-
tics: they are completely decentralized (there is no leader)
and making a payment only requires broadcasting a message.
To maximize fairness of comparison, we experiment with
Astro I, as its message pattern and cryptographic primitives
(MAC-based channel authentication) are the most similar to
BFT SMaRt.
We study the evolution of throughput within a window of
execution of 40s, ignoring a warm-up period of 20s. For
all these experiments, we introduce asynchrony or failure
after 30s elapse. To induce asynchrony, we again use the
traffic control utility tc with the network emulator queuing
discipline. We always use a delay of 100ms. For instance, to
introduce such a delay on all packets outgoing from interface
eth0 at a replica, we use the following command:
tc qdisc change dev eth0 root netem delay 100ms.
We use 10 clients, each running a single thread. The goal
is to evaluate these systems below saturation point. If we
introduce failures at saturation, this can lead BFT-SMaRt to
halt or enter a livelock where the system is unable to do view-
change (i.e. leader election). Moreover, at saturation point
Astro can sustain the same throughput independently of how
many replicas accept client operations; this is because no
single replica in our broadcast-based system is a bottleneck.
In other words, stopping a replica at saturation point in Astro
would not impact throughput, giving an advantage to our
system over the consensus-based solution. We first report
results for a system size N = 49. We run these experiments
with larger and smaller systems, but similar observations
emerge as the ones we describe below. For completeness, we
also discuss a set of interesting results with a larger system
size of N = 100.
In Figure 5 we show how the throughput evolves when
we introduce a crash-stop failure at a replica (N = 49). For
consensus, this failure has a severe impact on throughput if
the leader is affected (the Consensus-Leader curve), because
the view-change protocol has to execute. The throughput
drops to 0 while this protocol runs, typically a few seconds.
For larger system sizes, this protocol can take longer to
execute, as we will show later. When a random replica fails
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Fig. 6: Throughput robustness during asynchrony. We show, for
N=49, how throughput evolves in the consensus- and broadcast-
based systems during asynchrony (100ms delay for each outgoing
packet) at one replica, either the leader or random.
in the consensus-based system (Consensus-Random), there is
a brief decrease in throughput when all clients and replicas
get disconnected from the affected replica, but thereafter
performance recovers. In Astro I we stop a random replica
(Broadcast-Random), and thereafter throughput drops from
270 pps to 250 pps, which accounts for the failed replica
which was handling roughly 20 pps from one of the clients.
This decrease is barely visible in the plots.
Figure 6 shows how asynchrony impacts the performance
in the two systems (N = 49). We depict two separate
executions for the case of consensus when the leader is
affected, because there are two possible outcomes. First, it
may happen that throughput decreases and remains that way;
this is the Consensus-Leader-A timeline. Second, the system
can go through a view-change (Consensus-Leader-B) because
the leader is too slow or its buffers can overflow and packets
get dropped (inflating the replica-to-replica delay). Clearly,
initiating a view-change is preferable in this case, because the
throughput penalty is smaller. There is a well-known tradeoff,
however, in choosing the view-change timeout [29], [64]:
initiating view-change too aggressively can lead to frequent
leader changes even in good conditions, which can erode
performance on the long-run.
When a random replica is affected with asynchrony in
the consensus-based system (Consensus-Random execution
in Figure 6), performance drops briefly because there is a
quorum switch, i.e., the affected replica is replaced by a
different one in the active quorum [11]. For the broadcast-
based system (the Broadcast-Random timeline), asynchrony
affects performance in the same manner in which a failure
does. Concretely, the affected replica no longer sustains the
same amount of client operations, so the overall throughput
reduces correspondingly.
We also show results for the case of a larger system size
(N = 100) in Figure 7. There are four timelines in this
execution, as follows. For the consensus-based solution, we
show what happens when there is either a crash-stop failure
or asynchrony at the leader. In the former case (Consensus-
Fail), the view-change protocol kicks off and lasts for roughly
20 seconds, while throughput stays at zero; this is similar
to the Consensus-Leader execution in Figure 5. In the latter
case (Consensus-Async), performance degrades and stays that
way for as long as the affected replica remains the leader;
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Fig. 7: Throughput robustness. We show how throughput evolves
for N = 100 when a crash-stop failure or asynchrony affects the
consensus-based system or the broadcast-based system.
this is similar to the Consensus-Leader-A in Figure 6. For
the broadcast-based solution we consider the same two issues
affecting a random replica. When either of these issues arises
(Broadcast-Fail or Broadcast-Async) throughput is affected
correspondingly with the number of operations that the failed
replica is handling (and which is unable to continue). Note
that Astro relies on fate-sharing [28] between a client and its
representative: when a replica stops, all the associated xlogs
naturally stop as well.
We conclude with two general observations. First, Astro
does not suffer from overall (i.e., global) throughput degra-
dation that can happen in leader-based protocols such as
most consensus algorithms. Second, our system does not rely
on timeouts for liveness. Simply put, Astro progresses at
the speed of the network. These two advantages are closely
linked, and they both follow from the asynchronous nature
of the broadcast protocol we rely on.
VII. RELATED WORK
Since Nakamoto’s original Bitcoin paper [66], follow-up
payment systems seek to prevent double-spending by estab-
lishing a total order of transactions, i.e., solving consensus.
Consequently, a lot of effort has been devoted to improving
the consensus layer.
Dealing with the Consensus Bottleneck. Research on
consensus algorithms has shown significant breakthroughs
and modern protocols quote impressive performance num-
bers [83], [84]. To push performance even further, several
interesting systems address the consensus bottleneck with
sharding [5], [51], [57], [84], [80]. Approving a cross-shard
payment, however, requires special coordination [51], [80],
[84]. Off-chain payment networks such as Lightning [68] and
Raiden [67] strive to minimize the impact of consensus pro-
tocols. They allow parties to move funds from a blockchain
into high-performance payment channels, for which the final
balance is settled back on the blockchain after use. Recent
advances in this field rely on trusted hardware to provide an
asynchronous protocol for all interactions [55]. These results
bring noticeable improvements over Bitcoin, enabling good
scalability and very fast payments. Nevertheless, the under-
lying problem of consensus is only reduced, not overcome.
In Astro we take a different approach: We provide robust
performance by avoiding consensus protocols altogether.
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Performance Instability of Consensus. Recent work empha-
sizes the problem that performance of consensus algorithms
hangs on a fragile thread, namely their view-change sub-
protocol [20], [40], [82]. HotStuff, for instance, proposes
to absorb view-change in the common-case consensus algo-
rithm; this sidesteps performance instability but comes with
the cost of a higher common-case latency [82].
Another line of research circumvents the view-change
issue with randomized consensus protocols, such as Hon-
eyBadgerBFT [64] or BEAT [34]. Both are based on work
by Ben-Or et al. [13] combining reliable broadcast (BRB)
with binary Byzantine agreement (ABA). In a nutshell, these
protocols comprise a broadcast phase (where replicas form
encrypted batches of payments which they disseminate using
BRB), an agreement phase (involving N instances of the
ABA protocol to agree on a common set of batches), and
a decryption phase (requiring each replica to obtain f + 1
decryption shares). These protocols push the performance of
consensus by carefully choosing modern cryptographic tools
and system parameters.
Various leaderless consensus protocols have been pro-
posed, for both crash and Byzantine models [17], [30], [31],
[52], [65]. These protocols, however, either make use of some
form of coordinator in corner-cases, or rely on additional
synchrony assumptions, or provide probabilistic guarantees.
For example, a thorough study of the appendix of [65] reveals
that EPaxos only ensures probabilistic liveness and, as shown
recently [75], has correctness issues.
Astro is deterministic and fully asynchronous. It does not
solve the general consensus problem, but instead focuses on
payments. Since our system relies exclusively on BRB and no
BA primitive is necessary, Astro is simpler and more efficient
than modern leaderless randomized consensus protocols.
Avoiding Consensus Protocols. Recent theoretical re-
sults [45], [46] show that consensus is unnecessary for
implementing a payment system, contrary to popular belief.
For instance, [45] showed that the basic double-spending
problem, as defined by Nakamoto [66], can be cast as a
sequential object type and that it has consensus number
1 in Herlihy’s hierarchy [48]. Whilst the observation that
consensus is unnecessary to prevent double-spending in a
theoretical context has been made, we apply this insight for
the first time to obtain Astro: a full system solution (design,
implementation, evaluation), that is also efficient.
The exclusive logs in Astro resemble conflict-free repli-
cated data types (CRDTs) [72]. Similar to a CRDT, different
xlogs support concurrent updates while preserving consis-
tency. Since each log has a unique owner, we rule out
the possibility of conflicting operations on each log. Note,
however, that appending a payment to the history of a client’s
xlog A is not commutative, i.e., any two payments within the
same history need to be ordered with respect to one another.
This is a departure from classic CRDTs, but it ensures in
our case that the state at correct nodes always converges to
a consistent version.
Our xlog abstraction in Astro resembles the acyclic graph
(DAG) in various novel payment systems [26], [47], [50],
[73]. The distinctive feature of Astro, however, is that con-
sensus is entirely sidestepped—whereas all prior solutions
we are aware of, even those building on a DAG, employ a
consensus algorithm to order payments.
Broadcast Protocols. BRB protocols have a long tradition
starting with the algorithms of Bracha and Toueg [18], [19].
Later work refined and improved performance and properties
of these algorithms [22], [59], [61], [69]. Asynchronous
verifiable information dispersal algorithms [23] are closely
related to BRB protocols, and both of these classes of protocol
represent an essential building block in modern asynchronous
consensus protocols [34], [64].
There are several ways to improve the scalability of
broadcast protocols. Sharding—the technique we recalled
out above and we adopt in Astro II—is a clean approach
to scalability, as it allows each shard to maintain the same
(deterministic) properties as a non-sharded system. Other ap-
proaches, such as clustering [41], [70], probabilistic quorum-
based [62], or sample-based [44], typically yield a design
providing probabilistic guarantees.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Astro is a decentralized payment system that can sustain
20K payments/sec in a deployment of 200 replicas, while
exhibiting sub-second latency. It can do so by not relying on
any consensus layer and thus remaining mostly unaffected
by network asynchrony and compromised replicas. We do
not claim Astro to be a silver bullet: we only focused on
payments and did not consider the general abstraction of
state machine replication, e.g., as might be required by smart
contracts. Yet, determining the exact set of problems (besides
payments) that can be addressed by Astro’s broadcast layer
is an open problem. We also identified several avenues for
improving Astro, namely: (1) a more flexible representation
scheme, instead of the fixed dependency between a client
and its representative replica, (2) use more advanced cryp-
tographic primitives (e.g., threshold signatures, key revoca-
tion schemes), (3) a fine-grained state transfer protocol for
reconfiguration, and (4) a hybrid system that incorporates
asynchronous payments and consensus-based smart contracts.
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APPENDIX A
ASYNCHRONOUS RECONFIGURATION
The description of Astro is focused on a static system
with a fixed set of replicas and clients, in order to clearly
present its design. For long-lived systems, which we expect
a payment system to be, adding and removing replicas is
desirable, e.g., if participants decide to start/stop using the
payment system, or when replacing old replica machines by
new ones.
Reconfiguration of clients is straightforward: each client
has a representative replica r, so adding a client simply means
that r executes a BRB instance announcing the new client;
subsequently all replicas start maintaining the xlog of this
new client. Reconfiguration of system replicas is a more
challenging problem, which we discuss in the rest of this
section.
In consensus-based systems, reconfiguration can be han-
dled by the consensus module. For instance, BFT-SMaRt [14]
and similar systems [53] treat a reconfiguration request as
a special request which is totally-ordered just like ordinary
client requests.
Consensus, however, is not always necessary for reconfig-
uration. For example, DynaStore [4] and FreeStore [6] pro-
vide solutions for consensusless reconfiguration of read/write
storage in the asynchronous crash-stop model.
The purpose of this appendix is to briefly present a line of
research that – we believe – answers in the affirmative the
question of whether reconfiguration is possible for a payment
system in the Byzantine model. The consequence is that
our payment system does not require consensus throughout
the entirety of its lifetime, which eradicates any possible
argument supporting the necessity of consensus. In this line
of research, we adopt ideas from the FreeStore [6] protocol,
and to account for the Byzantine failure model we build on
Byzantine quorum systems [60]. Admittedly, the details of
reconfiguration are non-trivial and a thorough explanation of
it is an independent publication. Our goal is to present a
high-level overview of our ongoing result.
A. Overview
Throughout the lifetime of a system, each correct replica
passes through a sequence of numbered views. A view is a set
of replicas that a replica considers to constitute the system.
At any point in time, each replica has exactly one current
view.
The interface of the reconfiguration protocol exposes oper-
ations Join/Leave. Those operations consist of broadcasting a
JOIN/LEAVE message to some view v, which represents the
current state of the system as seen from the perspective of
the joining/leaving replica.
Our reconfiguration protocol guarantees that, for a finite
number of reconfiguration requests in any execution, all
replicas converge to a single final view which incorporates
every reconfiguration request issued in the execution. We say
that a view v is installed if some correct replica considers
v its current view and processes payment operations in
v. Moreover, our reconfiguration protocol ensures that the
installed views form a sequence. Our state transfer protocol
simply consists of sending all xlogs to the joining replica.
We adapt the payment protocol so that all messages include
the current view of the sending replica. Correct replicas be-
have consistently across views with respect to each payment.
When a replica r observes a view that is more recent
than r’s current view, r pauses payment execution. Roughly
speaking, r resumes execution after coordinating with a
quorum of replicas belonging to the new view, and then
r executes payments assuming the membership of the new
view. Since reconfiguration is not a very frequent operation,
we expect the overall downtime caused by reconfiguration to
be insignificant. We evaluate the reconfiguration overhead of
joining replicas in the next section.
B. Evaluation
The experiment of asynchronous reconfiguration starts
with a system of N = 4 replicas; subsequently, new replicas
join the system until N = 80, one by one. Note that our re-
configuration protocol allows batched joins (which we avoid
so that we can measure the latency of the protocol itself),
and that all replicas are randomly distributed across Europe
(§VI-B). During this experiment, the system is quiescent, i.e.
no client submits any payment.
We measure the latency (i.e. time to join) both for Astro II
and BFT-SMaRt in Figure 8. In Astro II, latency represents
the elapsed time between the moment when the joining
replica sends the reconfiguration request until this replica
becomes able to participate in the payment protocol. Latency
in BFT-SMaRt represents the elapsed time between sending
the special type of operation by the View Manager [15]
and sending message to the joining replica that it can start
participating in the protocol and should get up-to-date with
the rest of system. The first data point for Astro II shows
slightly higher latency than for subsequent points, which is
due to the fixed overhead of establishing connections between
replicas already in the system. As Figure 8 shows, latency in
BFT-SMaRt is an order of magnitude higher than in Astro II.
We are not aware of any published numbers on consensus-
based reconfiguration latency; we believe that the primary
reason for this difference in performance is owed to a simpler,
more efficient protocol.
C. Dynamic Byzantine Reliable Broadcast
Dynamic Byzantine Reliable Broadcast (DBRB) repre-
sents the continuation of the work briefly introduced earlier
(§A-A). An in-depth theoretical analysis of DBRB, along with
a thorough proof of its correctness, is provided in [42].
Instead of using BRB based on Bracha’s algorithm, Astro I
can adopt DBRB as an underlying broadcast layer. Since
DBRB provides the exact same properties (adapted to the
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Fig. 8: Reconfiguration latency. Latency (seconds) of a join
operation at different system sizes, in Astro II and in BFT-SMaRt.
dynamic environment) as those of the broadcast layer (includ-
ing totality), no further modifications of Astro I are needed.
Given that Astro II does not require the broadcast layer to
provide totality, we can use a modified version of DBRB that
does not provide totality (denoted with QDBRB).
The algorithm for QDBRB is obtained from the DBRB by
excluding the last “all-to-all” [42, Section 4.3] communica-
tion step. With this modification, QDBRB becomes a direct
replacement of the BRB within Astro II.
APPENDIX B
BROADCAST LAYER ALGORITHMS
In Listing 5 we sketch the algorithm implementing BRB
based on the work of Bracha and Toueg [19]. We use this
algorithm to build the broadcast layer in Astro I.
Astro II uses a BRB implementation based on digital
signatures [61], which we detail in Listing 6.
For completeness, we also provide pseudocode describing
the use of dependencies, i.e., the optimization that allows
Astro II to resolve the partial payments attack and enable
sharding. To address these issues, the representative replica
broadcasts a message a consisting of a payment together
with the dependencies accumulated by the issuer of the
payment since the last broadcast. More precisely, when a
replica receives a payment from a client, it executes the steps
outlined in Listing 7.
In the life-cycle of a payment, the dependencies of the
spender (Alice) are materialized into balance in her replicated
xlog, while the payment itself becomes a new dependency
for the beneficiary (Bob). In particular, we obtain a full
picture of the system by just re-defining the original approval
and settling procedures of Listing 3 and 4 with Listing 8
and 9, respectively. Finally, Listing 10 shows how to handle
the delivery of a proof at the representative replica of the
beneficiary, which happens after a payment is settled.
1 // Called at replica ’r’ to broadcast a message ’a’.
2 func Broadcast(a):
3 prep := 〈PREPARE, a〉
4 sendToAll(prep) // Send to all replicas.
6 // Process a protocol message m received from replica ’q’ at
7 // replica ’r’.
8 callback receive(q, m = 〈PREPARE, a〉):
9 // Handler for PREPARE messages.
10 let a be {s, ts, _, _}
11 if echoSent[q, (s, ts)] == false:
12 echoSent[q, (s, ts)] := true
13 sendToAll(〈ECHO, q, (s, ts), a〉)
15 callback receive(q, m = 〈ECHO, r, (s, ts), a〉):
16 // Handler for ECHO messages.
17 echoes[r, (s, ts), a] += q
18 if (|echoes[r, (s, ts), a]| ≥ 2F+1) &&
19 (readySent[r, (s, ts), a] == false):
20 readySent[r, (s, ts)] := true
21 sendToAll(〈READY, r, (s, ts), a〉)
23 callback receive(q, m = 〈READY, r, (s, ts), a〉):
24 // Handler for READY messages.
25 readys[r, (s, ts), a] += q
26 if (|readys[r, (s, ts), a]| ≥ F+1) &&
27 (readySent[r, (s, ts), a] == false):
28 readySent[r, (s, ts), a] := true
29 sendToAll(〈READY, r, (s, ts), a〉)
30 if (|readys[r, (s, ts), a]| ≥ 2F+1) &&
31 (delivered[r, (s, ts), a] == false) &&
32 (ts == allTS[s] + 1):
33 delivered[r, (s, ts), a] := true
34 trigger Deliver(a)
35 allTS[s] += 1
Listing 5: BRB protocol which we use in Astro I, based on [19].
1 // Called at replica ’r’ to broadcast a message ’a’.
2 func Broadcast(a)
3 prep := 〈PREPARE, a〉
4 // Send the prepare message to all replicas.
5 sendToAll(prep)
7 // Process a protocol message m received from replica ’q’ at
8 // replica ’r’.
9 callback receive(q, m)
10 if (m = 〈PREPARE, a〉)
11 let a be {s, ts, _, _}
12 pending[(s, ts)] := a
13 sig := Sign(m)
14 ackMsg := 〈ACK, (s, ts), sig〉
15 unicast(q, ackMsg) // Reply to replica q with ACK.
16 else if (m = 〈ACK, (s, ts), sig〉)
17 return if invalidSignature(sig)
18 acks[(s, ts)] := acks[(s, ts)] ∪ {(q, sig)}
19 if (|acks[(s, ts)]| == 2f+1)
20 commitMsg = 〈COMMIT, (s, ts), acks[(s, ts)]〉
21 sendToAll(commitMsg) // Broadcast the commit message
.
22 else if (m = 〈COMMIT, (s, ts), proof〉)
23 return if (|proof| < 2f+1) || (invalidSignatures(
proof))
24 a := pending[(s, ts)]
25 // Release payment ’a’ to the payment layer
26 trigger Deliver(a)
Listing 6: BRB protocol based on digital signatures, inspired by
early work of Malkhi and Reiter [61], which we use in Astro II.
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27 @executes at the representative replica
28 @local state: DepMap deps[..] //dependencies per client
30 callback receive(a):
31 let a be 〈Alice, n, b, x〉
32 Broadcast(〈Alice, n, b, x, deps[Alice]〉)
33 deps[Alice] := {}
Listing 7: Using dependencies in Astro II. Representative
replica broadcasts payment with dependencies.
34 func approve(a)
35 let a be 〈Alice, n, _, x, dependencies〉
36 wait until sn[Alice] = n - 1
Listing 8: Payment approval for BRB of Listing 6. Every replica
executes this to approve a payment a, assuming spender Alice.
37 @executes at all system replicas
38 // Used dependencies per client
39 @local state: DepMap usedDeps[..]
41 func settle(a)
42 let a be 〈Alice, n, b, x, dependencies〉
44 // Keep only the never seen before dependencies
45 newDeps = set(dependencies) \ usedDeps[Alice]
46 usedDeps[Alice] = usedDeps[Alice] ∪ newDeps
48 bal[Alice] += balanceOf(newDeps) // Credit balance
49 if bal[Alice] < x: return
51 bal[Alice] -= x // Withdraw from Alice’s balance
52 sn[Alice] += 1
53 xlogs[Alice].append(a)
55 d = (Alice, n, b, x)
56 // Send proof to Bob’s representative (Credit message)
57 trigger unicast(b, (d, Sign(d)))
Listing 9: Payment settling procedure for BRB of Listing 6.
Each replica executes this protocol to transition a payment a to
the final, settled state.
58 @executes at the representative replica
59 @local state: DepMap deps[..] // dependencies per client
60 DepMap partialDeps[..]
62 callback DeliverUnicast(proof)
63 let proof be 〈payment, sig〉
64 let payment be 〈Alice, n, b, x〉
66 if !check(proof, payment):
67 return
68 partialDeps[payment].add(proof)
70 // An incoming payment that collects f+1 proofs becomes
71 // a dependency.
72 if len(partialDeps[payment]) = f + 1:
73 deps[Alice].add(partialDeps[payment])
74 delete(partialDeps[payment])
Listing 10: Handling of dependencies for BRB of Listing 6. The
representative replica executes this protocol every time a proof
of an incoming payment is received.
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